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The paper provides a systematic comparison of the Eurosystem, the US Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of Japan. These monetary authorities exhibit somewhat different status and tasks, which reflect 
different historical conditions and national characteristics. However, widespread changes in central 
banking practices in the direction of greater independence and increased transparency, as well as 
changes in the economic and financial environment over the past 15-20 years, have contributed to 
reduce the differences among these three world’s principal monetary authorities. A comparison based 
on simple “over-the-counter” policy reaction functions shows no striking differences in terms of 
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This paper provides a systematic comparison of the Eurosystem, established in 1998; the US 
Federal Reserve System (Fed), established in 1914; and the Bank of Japan (BoJ), established in 1882. 
The structures and organisation of these three central banking systems reflect different historical 
conditions as well as national characteristics. While the legal status and several of their tasks differ 
somewhat, we find that there are fewer differences in their institutional structures, monetary policy 
frameworks, as well as the use of policy instruments. The paper analyses various factors that have 
played an important role in reducing the differences among these three world’s principal monetary 
institutions. 
One of these factors is represented by the fact that central banking practices around the world 
have evolved in the direction of, inter alia, greater independence, transparency and the adoption of 
monetary policy committees. This has helped to reduce the differences among the three institutions, 
which is a trend that can also be observed among other central banks. However, there remain some de 
facto differences in the way the monetary policy committees operate.  
Some differences in terms of communication strategies also exist, although the financial markets 
seem very responsive to both the Eurosystem and the Fed’s communication. However, the Fed does 
not quantify its definition of price stability, whereas the ECB and the BoJ do. Nor does it spell out a 
fully-fledged monetary policy strategy (again in contrast to the ECB and the BoJ). The ECB does not 
publish the minutes of its Governing Council meetings, unlike the Fed and the BoJ, although it should 
be noted that the ECB does provide extensive real-time information after interest rate decisions have 
been taken. The decision not to publish voting records has to be seen against the background of 
potential public pressures that the members of the Governing Council might face from their respective 
home countries. All these elements, however, seem to have little impact on the actual conduct of 
monetary policy. 
Another factor that has also contributed to reducing the differences between the Eurosystem, the 
Fed and the BoJ is represented by the declining “internal” differentials in their economic and financial 
environment. Information on this can be obtained, for the US, by looking at data regarding the US 
Census Regions; for Japan by looking at the data for the 10 Japanese Districts and, for the euro area, 
1980 to 2004 inflation dispersion in the US remained within a considerably narrow range, whereas in 
the euro area it trended downward reaching levels comparable to those in the US just prior to the 
launch of the euro. Inflation differentials in Japan have remained at a very low level since the 1980s. 
Differentials in economic growth have all sharply declined over the last 15-20 years. Against this 
5
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from the national data for the 12 euro area countries (up to the time of the writing of the paper). From  
background, the Fed and the BoJ still operate in a more harmonious economic and financial 
environment. 
There are several caveats and limitations to our analysis. First, as the euro area did not start 
operating until 1999, synthetic euro area data for a large part of the sample period must be used. This 
obviously restricts our ability to interpret the results. Second, looking at developments in the main 
macroeconomic variables, it is notable that all the three areas have exhibited declining inflation and 
falling short-term and long-term interest rates; however, some of these phenomena are global and are 
not restricted to the three areas only. Third, the US, the euro area and Japan have faced a series of 
diverse challenges, some of them country-specific (as for Japan), and others more global in nature, 
which cannot be taken fully into account. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the euro area is a 
new monetary area, even though the process of European integration started as far back as the 1950s 
for a smaller subset of European countries. The sharing of a new single currency is deemed to 
engender “endogenous effects”, i.e. it may contribute to a further deepening of economic and financial 
integration. Indeed, it could be turning into a so-called optimum currency area (OCA). Therefore, the 
euro area may be witnessing some further transformation that the other two monetary areas have 
already experienced in the past. 
More generally, in the past conditions differed considerably in the three currency areas, with a 
much higher dispersion among euro area Member States than within the US and Japan. Only in recent 
years have such differences diminished significantly, particularly within the euro area. Finally, a 
comparison based on a simple “over-the-counter” policy reaction function à-la-Taylor shows no 
striking differences in the actual implementation of monetary policy. The evidence from the analysis, 
therefore, would support the conclusion that, in practice, the monetary policies of the Eurosystem, the 
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1  Introduction 
On 1 January 1999 the euro was established as the single currency of 11 European countries, 
which on 1 January 2001 increased to 12 when Greece joined the euro area. Since January 1999 the 
European Central Bank (the “ECB” hereafter) is responsible for the single monetary policy in the 
Eurosystem, which represents the central banking system of the euro area. As yet, there is no 
comprehensive comparison of the Eurosystem with the monetary authorities operating in the other 
two large currency areas in the world, namely the Federal Reserve System of the United States 
(henceforth the “Fed”), which was established in 1914, and the Bank of Japan (henceforth the “BoJ”), 
which was established in 1882.  
The structures of these three monetary institutions reflect different historical conditions as well as 
national characteristics. However, in recent years some widespread changes in central banking 
practices have taken place concerning, inter alia, a higher degree of independence, greater 
transparency as well as the adoption of monetary policy committees, which have since then been 
embraced by most central banks around the world (see among others Blinder 2004, Blinder and 
Wyplosz 2004, and Fujiki 2005).  This has contributed to reducing the differences among the 
Eurosystem, the Fed and the BoJ (as well as other central banks which are not the focus of this paper). 
The main aim of this paper is to provide the first analytical comparison of the Eurosystem, the Fed 
and the BoJ, expanding the more descriptive analysis contained in Gerdesmeier, Lichtenberger and 
Mongelli (2005). We make three main original contributions. First, we illustrate some of the main 
similarities and differences in the actual behaviour of the three institutions, examining the different 
environments in which they carry out their tasks. Second, we evaluate the monetary policy rules for the 
to ascertain whether the responses of these central banks to their contingent economic factors differ and, 
if so, by how much. Third, central banking practices have evolved around the world: we highlight some 
areas in which there might be some disparity between the legislative framework and the actual practices 
− i.e. the de jure aspects as well as the de facto aspects − for the three central banks.  
Of course, this comparison has some limitations which should be taken into account. For 
example, regarding the ECB we use some “synthetic” euro area data that cover the period before the 
establishment of the ECB, which are constructed on the basis of national developments prior to 1999. 
                                                           
 The Eurosystem itself became operational slightly before in 1998; however, the individual national central banks of the 
Eurosystem were of course established much earlier: the Banque de France for example in 1800, De Nederlandsche Bank in 
1814, the Banque Nationale de Belgique in 1850, the Banco de España in 1856, the Banca d’Italia in 1893 and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank in 1957. 
 Undoubtedly this followed the identification of the problem of dynamic inconsistency (i.e. the “inflation bias”) formulated 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977), and the solution by delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank postulated 
by Rogoff (1985). See also Barro and Gordon (1983) and McCallum (1989). 
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three central banks using the framework developed by Taylor (Taylor, 1993a). The aim of this exercise is  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 firstly compares the institutional structures, 
monetary policy frameworks and objectives of the three central banks, and secondly discusses the 
issues of independence, accountability, transparency, communication and strategy. Section 3 contains 
an overview of the environment in which the three central banks operate. The economic and financial 
environment in which they carry out their tasks has also changed considerably over time. This 
represents one of the most important transformations undertaken during the sample period and must 
be taken into consideration in the analysis. As an example of this effect, there is a presumption that 
the introduction of the euro may foster further endogenous economic and financial integration in the 
euro area. Section 4 provides the results of a comparison of the reaction functions estimated for the 
three institutions. In this paper we scrutinise their policy reaction functions using a Taylor-rule 
framework with the aim of improving our understanding of the different roles and challenges that 
these central banks face. Such framework is also commonly used in the literature (e.g. in the annual 
monitoring of the ECB by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), as well as in many 
empirical works on policy rules, especially for the US).  Section 5 provides some final remarks and 
qualifications.  
 
2  The institutional structures and monetary policy framework  
2.1  Organisational framework and institutional features of the three central banks 
The Maastricht Treaty (henceforth the “Treaty”) contains the institutional arrangements for the 
conduct of monetary policy in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. The Treaty, which 
entered into force in November 1993, provides the legal basis for the formation of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), which comprises the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of 
the 25 Member States of the European Union (EU). The term “Eurosystem” denotes a subset of the 
ESCB that comprises the ECB and the NCBs of those EU Member States that have adopted the euro. 
The governing bodies of the Eurosystem are the Governing Council and the Executive Board. The 
latter consists of the President, the Vice-President and four board members. Its main task is to 
implement the decisions of the Governing Council, which currently consists of the Executive Board 
members plus the 12 governors of the euro area NCBs (see Figure 1). While the members of the 
governors range between five and eight years. 
                                                           
 It should, however, be noted that this is used only for illustrative purposes, as the ECB does not, for example, pursue any 
form of inflation targeting. 
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Executive Board are appointed for a non-renewable eight-year term, the terms of office for NCB  
 
Figure 1   Organisational Framework of the Eurosystem 
 
N otes: NCB refers to the national central banks of the 12 euro area countries.
Impl ement at i on
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Source: Gerdesmeier, Lichtenberger and Mongelli (2004). 
 
The institutional arrangements of the Eurosystem in some ways resemble those of the Fed (see 
Figure 2). Goodfriend (1999) observes that both the Fed and the Eurosystem are federal central bank 
systems. The Fed became more centralised with the Banking Act of 1935. For its part, the ECB has in 
principle a role similar to that of the Fed’s Board of Governors, while the 12 NCBs of the Eurosystem 
play a role similar to the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks in the US. In a similar fashion the 
President of the ECB chairs the Governing Council meetings in much the same way as the Chairman 
of the Fed’s Board of Governors chairs the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 
In the euro area, the Governing Council is responsible for formulating the monetary policy of the 
euro area, a task that is carried out by the FOMC in the US. The members of the Fed’s Board of 
Governors are appointed for a fourteen-year term, i.e. nearly twice as long as the eight-year term 
foreseen for the members of the ECB’s Executive Board. However, both terms are non-renewable. 
The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors instead both serve for a four-year term. 
These terms may be renewed as long as their term within the Board has not expired. However, in 
practice the previous Chairman served over eighteen years as that he had originally been appointed to 
serve out the unexpired term of his predecessor. 
While there are many similarities in the structures of the Eurosystem and the Fed, there are also 
some key differences. One difference concerns the voting rights. Currently all NCB governors have 
an equal vote in all policy decisions taken by the Eurosystem Governing Council. Participation in 
9
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FOMC voting, by contract, is more restricted: all seven members of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System have a permanent voting right, as does the President of the New York Fed, 
whereas the Presidents of the Chicago and Cleveland branches alternate annually, and the other nine 
reserve bank presidents share only four votes on a rotating basis (however, they do attend all FOMC 
meetings and participate in discussions even when they cannot vote).  
 
Figure 2   Organisational Framework of the Federal Reserve System 
 
 
Notes: FRBs are the regional Federal Reserve Banks of the 12 districts. 
  T he solid line in the im plem entation stage denotes the fact that the Fed 
N ew  Y ork is entrusted w ith the conduct of open m arket operations. 
  T he dashed line in the im plem entation stage denotes the fact that the 
Board of Directors of each Fed Bank sets the discount rate (subject to the 
approval of the Board of Governors). 
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Source: Pollard (2003). 
 
With regard to the BoJ, the highest decision-making body is the Policy Board (see Figure 3). The 
Board comprises the Governor, two Deputy Governors and six appointed members. Each of these nine 
members is appointed by the Cabinet for five years, and his or her appointment must be approved by the 
Diet. The board members elect the Chairman of the Policy Board among themselves. Since September 
2006 the Governor of the Bank has also been appointed Chairman of the Policy Board. The Policy Board 
takes its decisions by a majority vote. The BoJ operates more as a head office than a federal system of 
central banks, and is in charge of 32 domestic local branches (LBs) and 12 local offices (LOs).  
 
                                                           
 The voting system will change when more countries adopt the single currency, and the Governing Council has already 
Statute of the ESCB which provides for an adjustment of the voting modalities in the Governing Council (see ECB, 2003). 
According to the new voting scheme, the six members of the Executive Board will always maintain a permanent voting 
right, whereas the voting rights of NCB governors will be subject to a rotation scheme once the number of euro area 
10
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countries exceeds 15. However, all governors will participate in all meetings of the Governing Council irrespective of 
whether they hold a voting right at that time. 





made provisions for voting rights in an enlarged euro area. In 2003, the European Council approved an amendment to the  
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Source: BoJ (2003a). 
 
While monetary policies in all three areas are currently based on a collective decision-making 
system ─ i.e. by the respective (monetary policy) committees –  there may be some more de facto 
differences in how these committees operate.  Blinder (2004) observes that not all committees are 
characterised by the same status. A collegial committee prizes solidarity and strives for group ownership 
of its decisions. The chairman forges consensus and, where possible, seeks to achieve unanimity in the 
decision-making process. Conversely, in an individualistic committee, differences of opinion (if any) are 
voiced and conclusions are reached by majority voting, if necessary. Hence, individual members are 
allowed to express their preferences and do not always have to embrace the group’s decisions. 
When taking monetary policy decisions, both the Governing Council and the Board of Governors 
officially act by simple majority voting. In practice, both the Governing Council and the FOMC 
operate as collegial committees. However, according to Blinder, the former functions as a genuinely 
collegial committee practising consensus voting, whereas, within the latter, the former chairman was 
able to steer the agenda very tightly. By contrast, the BoJ’s Policy Board operates in a more 
individualistic manner than the other two committees.  
                                                           
 The decision by the most important central banks to switch to a collective decision-making system by committee is itself 
the subject of current research. Blinder (2004), Blinder and Wyplosz (2004), and Fujiki (2005) analyse and survey the many 
facets of such an evolution. Among other factors, they note that monetary policy set by a committee is likely to be changed 
less frequently than monetary policy set by a single central bank governor. Furthermore, committee members bring different 
decision heuristics and preferences to the discussion. A committee then pools the views of its members, and is certainly less 
such as those by a monetary policy committee – outperform individual ones. 
  See Blinder (2004), p. 29. 
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In addition to the monetary policy function, all three central banks perform a number of other 
functions and tasks (see Table 1). Most of these are common to all three central banks, although some 
vary on the grounds of other factors (some of which historical) that are not addressed here (for more 
information in this regard, see Gerdesmeier, Lichtenberger and Mongelli, 2004). 
 
Table 1   Selected Features and Tasks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System
and the Bank of Japan
1 
 
  Federal Reserve 
System 
Eurosystem 
2/  Bank of Japan 
Define and implement 
monetary policy 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Issue banknotes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Conduct foreign exchange 
operations 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Hold and manage official 
reserves 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Act as the fiscal agent for the 
government 
Yes NCBs  Yes 
Promote stability and financial 
system 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Supervise banks  Yes  Some NCBs  On a contractual basis 
Promote the smooth operation 
of the payments system 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Collect statistical information  Yes Yes  Yes 
Participate in meetings of 
international monetary 
institutions 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Sources: BoJ (2003a), ECB (2004), Gerdesmeier, Lichtenberger and Mongelli (2004) and Pollard (2003). 
1  Institutional structures: the Federal Reserve System comprises the Board of Governors (Washington DC) 
and 12 federal reserve banks (including their 25 branches); the Eurosystem comprises the ECB in Frankfurt 
am Main (Germany) and 12 NCBs (including regional branches); the BoJ, on the other hand, is not a federal 
system: it has a head office in Tokyo, and 32 local branches. 
2  The acronym NCBs here refers to the national central banks of the Eurosystem. 
 
2.2  Monetary policy objectives 
The Treaty states that “the primary objective of the ESCB  shall be to maintain price stability” 
and that “without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies of the [European] Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the [European] Community”. The objectives of the Community are inter alia to ensure 
“a high level of employment […], sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of 
                                                           
 The Treaty refers to the ESCB rather than to the Eurosystem, since it was drawn up on the premise that eventually all EU 
Member States would adopt the euro. 
12
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competitiveness and convergence of economic performance”. The Treaty thus establishes a clear 
hierarchy of objectives for the ECB and assigns overriding importance to price stability (see Table 2). 
Moreover, the ECB has made public its precise quantititative definition of price stability. 
The ESCB’s mandate to pursue price stability contrasts with the Fed’s multiple-objective mandate. 
The latter’s mandate states that “the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal 
Open Market Committee shall maintain long-run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates 
commensurate with the country’s long-run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively 
the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates” (Federal 
Reserve Act, Section 2A.1). Against this background, it is worth noting that Goodfriend (1999) finds 
that although the US Congress has not assigned an explicit mandate to pursue low inflation, the Fed 
seeks to educate the public about the benefits of low inflation and the need to pre-empt it. Hence, the 
Fed’s policymakers seem to assign at least an implicit ranking to these goals, although in the long run all 
three are compatible.  It has been argued that despite its multiple objectives, the Fed has traditionally 
placed more emphasis on achieving price stability and, in recent years, there have been calls for a clearer 
price stability mandate for the Fed (see Wynne, 1999 and Bernanke, 2003a). 
As for the BoJ, its main objectives are first to maintain price stability in its conduct of monetary 
policy; and second, to ensure the smooth and stable operation of the payment and settlement system 
through measures such as acting as a lender of last resort. In both cases, the goal is to maintain 
financial system stability, thereby laying the foundations for sound economic development (BoJ, 
2003a). On 9 March 2006, the BoJ introduced a new framework for the conduct of monetary policy, 
and additionally reviewed its thinking on price stability in order to secure that its decision to abandon 
quantitative easing is better understood.  In this respect, price stability was seen as being consistent 
with a change in the price index without a measurement bias of zero percent. In quantitative terms, 
however, an approximate range between zero and 2 percent was deemed to be consistent with the 
views of the Board members on medium to long-term price stability, although the median figures fell 
on both sides of 1 percent. Furthermore, the BoJ also stated that it regarded a consumer price index as 
an adequate measure for evaluating price developments. 
                                                           
  Fed officials have repeatedly clarified that the Fed understands “maximum employment” as meaning “maximum 
sustainable employment”, i.e. non-inflationary employment: “The Fed’s dual mandate – full employment and price stability 
– is really quite unique. Actually, the specific language of the mandate is that the Fed should promote price stability and 
maximum employment. We presume that the Congress did not intend to give us contradictory objectives, so we interpret the 
objective as price stability and maximum sustainable employment. Maximum sustainable employment is sometimes also 
referred to as full employment, i.e. “the maximum level of employment sustainable without upward pressure on inflation” 
 See Press Release dated 9 March 2006. 
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downward pressures on price stability, and not in terms of their absolute levels. 






Table 2   Elements of the Monetary Framework of the Eurosystem,  
the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of Japan 
 









comprising 18 members: 
the ECB Executive Board 
(6 members) and the 
governors of the 12 NCBs 
of the Eurosystem. 
Federal Open Market 
Committee, comprising 12 
members: the Board of 
Governors (7 members), the 
President of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank and 4 
other reserve banks presidents 
(on a rotating basis) 
Policy Board (9 members)  
Monetary policy 
objective(s) 
Price stability is the 
primary objective. This is 
defined in precise 
quantitative terms. 
Multiple objectives: to 
promote maximimum 
employment, stable prices and 
moderate long-term interest 
rates. 
Multiple objectives: price 
stability (now defined within a 













(scheduled at 2.30 pm);  
•  Annual Report to EU 
institutions and 
presentations to the 
European Parliament; 
•  Monthly Bulletin 
published. 
•  Immediate announcement 
and minutes following the 
FOMC; 
 
•  Hearings before the 
Congress; 
 
•  Monthly Bulletin/Report by 
the regional federal reserve 
banks.   
•  Immediate announcement 
after monetary policy 
meetings (generally around 
noon); 
•  Governor’s press conference 
(scheduled at 3.30 pm); 
•  subsequent publication of 
minutes (generally one-
month later, three days after 
the following monetary 
policy meeting); 
•  Monthly Report of the Policy 
Board published; 




Preannounced strategy.  Risk management approach.   Approach focusing on the 
information content of a variety 




conducted by the 
Eurosystem). 
Centralised (operations 
conducted by the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank). 
Centralised. 
Sources:  BoJ, ECB and the Fed. 
1  See Gerdesmeier, Lichtenberger and Mongelli (2004) for a description and comparison of the independence, 
accountability and transparency of each of these three central banks. 
 
2.3  Central bank independence 
In many countries the gradual process of shifting responsibility from an individual central banker 
to a monetary policy committee has coincided with granting independence to the central bank 
(Blinder, 2004). Central bank independence is a multilayered concept with several elements, 
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including:  personal independence, which pertains to the influence of the government in the 
appointment process, the duration of the terms of office, and dismissal procedures; financial 
independence, which concerns the separation between the finances of the government and of the 
central bank, as well as the setting of the bank’s budget; and functional independence, which is also 
referred to as policy independence, and is related to the autonomy in formulating and executing 
monetary policy.
instruments. 
Article 108 of the Treaty establishes that the Eurosystem is independent from any political 
influence. Four main provisions safeguard the independence of both the Eurosystem and its decision-
making bodies. First, the ECB’s financial arrangements are kept separate from the financial interests 
of the European Community. The ECB has its own budget, and its capital is subscribed and paid up 
by the euro area NCBs. Second, potential political influence on individual members of the ECB’s 
decision-making bodies is minimised: the members of the Governing Council are endowed with 
relatively long mandates, while a rule stipulates that members of the Executive Board cannot be 
reappointed. Third, the Eurosystem’s independence is strengthened by the prohibition laid down in the 
Treaty of any provision of central bank credit to the public sector. Finally, the Eurosystem is also 
functionally independent. The ECB has at its disposal all the instruments and competencies necessary 
to conduct its monetary policy and is authorised to decide autonomously how and when to use them.  
While the Fed enjoys significant independence, it has been argued that this is somewhat lower 
Congress the right to “coin money and regulate the value thereof”. While the Congress has delegated 
shaping the Federal Reserve Act was also to keep politics out of monetary policy. There are a number 
of provisions designed to safeguard the independence of the Fed. For example, the Fed is independent 
of other branches and agencies of the government. It is self-financed and is, therefore, not subject to 
the congressional budgetary process. The terms of the seven members of the Board of Governors, who 
are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, span multiple presidential and 
congressional terms, as a full term lasts fourteen years. In practice this can be even longer as, although 
a member who has served a full term may not be reappointed, a reappointment is possible for a 
member who has completed an unexpired portion of a term. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
                                                           
 See, among others, Blinder (1998 and 2004), Cukierman (2001), Geraats (2004), King (2004) and Woodford (2003). 
Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) and Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger (2001) provide an extensive analysis of the implications 
of the diverse aspects of central bank independence for economic performance (i.e. inflation levels, stability and economic 
growth): there is still considerable debate on the implications of central bank independence and the policy preference of 
central bankers. 
 Moreover, the ECB has the right to adopt binding regulations to the extent necessary to carry out the tasks of the ESCB 
(as well as in certain other cases as laid down in specific acts of the EU Council). 
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this responsibility to the Fed, it could, in principle, revoke it at any time. The intent of the Congress in 
than that for the Eurosystem (see, for example, Wynne, 1999). The US Constitution grants the  
Board are chosen by the President from among the sitting governors and must be confirmed by the 
Senate. They serve terms of four years and may be reappointed as Chairman or Vice Chairman until 
their terms as governors expire. 
As for the BoJ, its law was revised in 1997 to secure independence of the central bank. The law 
states that “the Bank of Japan’s autonomy regarding currency and monetary control shall be 
respected”. To ensure such independence, members of the Policy Board cannot be dismissed for 
holding opinions at variance with the government, and the government cannot order the Bank to 
undertake any particular policy action or to conduct any particular business operation. At the same 
time, it is important that the Bank’s monetary policy is consistent with the government’s basic 
economic policy framework. Therefore, the BoJ shall “always maintain close contact with the 
government and exchange views sufficiently”. The Bank of Japan Law also allows representatives of 
the government to attend the Monetary Policy Meetings (MPMs) of the Policy Board in order to give 
their views and submit proposals, or to request that the Board postpones a vote on monetary policy 
measures until the next meeting. However, the government representatives cannot vote on monetary 
policy decisions. 
Some further differences among the three central banks also exist in terms of exchange rate 
policies. In the US, foreign exchange policy is fully in the hands of the Treasury Department. In 
Japan, foreign exchange interventions are decided by the Ministry of Finance. The BoJ undertakes 
these interventions as an agent of the government, using government funds. As far as the euro area is 
concerned, Article 111 of the Treaty gives the Council – acting either on a recommendation from the 
Commission and after consulting the ECB, or on a recommendation from the ECB – the right to 
formulate “general orientations for exchange rate policy”. At the same time, the Treaty also contains 
provisions which ensure that the pursuit of the objective of price stability is fully respected by the 
Overall, the Eurosystem is one of the most independent central bank systems in the world. 
However, this must be set against the increasing desire on the part of the public for transparency (as 
Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002 observe). This brings us to our next point, namely the importance of 
institutional features for central banks. 
 
2.4  Accountability, transparency and communication  
Goodfriend (1999) observes that in the early 1980s under the Chairmanship of Paul Volcker, the 
Fed realised that bringing down inflation and maintaining it at a low level would be easier if the Fed 
had the necessary credibility in terms of being committed to fight for low inflation. Fed officials 
considered communication with the public a useful tool for building credibility. In the same vein, 
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single exchange rate policy (ECB, 2004).  
Woodford (2003) points out that transparency may help enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
However, this may create a potential conflict for central banks: a maximum level of transparency may 
not be optimal and could lead to less clarity and common understanding (see also Kahnemann, 2003, 
Mishkin, 2004 and Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005). In this sub-section we briefly compare the three 
central banks with regard to accountability, transparency and communication.  
 
2.4.1  Accountability  
To retain legitimacy, an independent central bank must be accountable to democratic institutions 
and to the general public for its actions in the pursuit of its mandate. The Treaty lays down a number 
of reporting requirements for the ECB − for example, the presentation of an Annual Report to the 
European Parliament, the Commission and the EU Council − and establishes the need to make regular 
presentations to the European Parliament to ensure accountability (see ECB, 2004).  
Similar reporting procedures have been laid down in the US and Japan. The Fed is ultimately 
accountable to the Congress, which can amend the Federal Reserve Act legislation at any time. The 
Fed must report once a year on its activities to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and twice 
a year on its plans for monetary policy to the Congress’ banking committees. Fed officials also testify 
before the Congress when requested. 
The BoJ has different reporting obligations and publishes an outline of its business operations 
submits a report on currency and monetary control to the Diet twice a year, and the BoJ’s Governor or 
a designated representative appears upon request before the Diet committees  to explain the BoJ’s 
policies, business operations and balance sheet conditions.  In addition, the BoJ Governor regularly 
holds a press conference after monetary policy meetings to explain the policy decisions taken. A 
transcript of the press conference is also made available, albeit only in Japanese. 
Since the introduction of a new framework for the conduct of monetary policy (as mentioned in 
sub-section 2.2), the BoJ examines economic activity and prices from two perspectives. The first 
focuses on the economic outlook and price expectations one to two years ahead. The second 
perspective is oriented more to the long term and examines those risks that are most relevant to the 
future periodical publications, such as the Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices. 
 
                                                           
 Although the full version of the report is only available in Japanese, a summary of the report is available in English. 
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(BoJ, 2004). Similarly to the Fed’s semi-annual report on monetary policy to the Congress, the BoJ 
conduct of monetary policy (see BoJ, 2006). The outcome of this analysis will also be reflected in 
17
17 
2.4.2  Transparency 
Transparency is a concept that is closely related to, yet distinct from, accountability. The 
transparency of monetary policy can be defined as the extent to which central banks disclose 
information related to the policymaking process. In the words of Blinder (2004), such information 
should be clear, have a substantive content and be open to public scrutiny.  The boundaries of 
transparency vis-à-vis accountability and communication vary according to authors. Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2002) distinguish between five types of transparency, namely: 
•  political transparency, which refers to openness about policy objectives and consists of being 
clear about the formal objectives of monetary policy (this aspect is discussed in sub-section 
2.5);  
•  economic transparency, which focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary 
policy (including economic data, policy models and forecasts);  
•  procedural transparency, which reflects the way monetary policy decisions are taken. This 
involves an explicit monetary policy rule or strategy that describes the monetary policy 
framework (see sub-section 2.5); 
•  policy transparency, which means that policy decisions should be promptly announced. In 
addition, it includes an explanation of the decision together with a policy inclination or 
indication of likely future policy actions; and finally, 
•  operational transparency, which concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy 
actions. 
Concerning the Eurosystem, Winkler (2002) notes different aspects of transparency that have 
been receiving greater attention, including openness, clarity and information efficiency (see Figure 4). 
He, however, warns that an effective approach to communication requires a balance to be struck 
between being open about the complex nature of policymaking, and simplifying the presentation of 
this process in the interest of greater clarity. Blinder (2004) also notes that monetary policy decision-





                                                           
 Ultimately, transparency aims at ensuring that monetary policy is better understood by the public and by the various 




















Source: Winkler (2002). 
 
According to Trichet (2004), both the Eurosystem and the Fed place strong emphasis on ensuring 
the transparency of the decision-making process and the transparency of the analyses made by the 
responsible decision-making “college”. Moreover, transparency also characterises both institutions in 
terms of the explanations of the economic diagnosis provided to the public and to market participants, 
with all the decisions being released in real time. 
Concerning clarity, the publication of a precise quantitative definition of price stability by the 
ECB – as opposed to the Fed’s practice – may be seen as a component of both transparency and 
accountability, as it provides the public with a yardstick against which the performance of the ECB 
can be measured. 
For the ECB, the Introductory Statement at each ECB press conference shortly after the first 
Governing Council meeting each month represents a means of almost instantaneously announcing and 
explaining the most recent monetary policy decision. Similarly, the current practice of the FOMC is to 
announce policy changes as soon as they are made. Immediately after each meeting, the FOMC issues 
a statement to the effect that a decision has been taken to lower or raise rates, or, in case the decision 
was to leave rates unchanged, merely noting that the meeting has ended. The FOMC also publishes 
the minutes of each meeting three weeks later. 
The Bank of Japan Law requires the BoJ to “endeavour to clarify to the public the content of its 
decisions, as well as its decision-making process”. In accordance with this provision, after each MPM, 
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the Policy Board makes public any decisions reached, including the guidelines for money market 
operations and the Bank’s assessment of economic and financial developments. The BoJ − like the 
Fed − releases the minutes of the MPMs around one month after the meeting, and publishes a detailed 
record of the discussions ten years after each meeting. Other matters decided at the Policy Board 
meetings are disclosed in the Monthly Report of the BoJ’s Policy Board. 
It has been argued that the publication of minutes makes the Fed and the BoJ more transparent 
than the ECB. The main reasons why the ECB currently abstains from publishing minutes are 
twofold. First, the ECB intends to communicate to the public that the entity which decides is not a 
personality − or a group of personalities − but rather a college (i.e. a united team which benefits from 
its collegial wisdom). Second, the ECB does not want to convey the impression that it is a place 
where various national interests, as represented by various NCB governors, can be reconciled. In fact, 
the Treaty clearly requires decisions to be taken in the interest of the euro area as a whole, and thus 
any kind of reasoning on the basis of a national vision is excluded. This makes the situation in the 
euro area somewhat different from those of the US or Japan. In any case, the ECB publishes its 
“diagnosis” in real time, so that all the arguments that led to the decision are presented in full to the 
public. Several recent studies have shown the ECB to be highly predictable in its decisions, which is 
one of the ultimate goals of transparency. 
Furthermore, as several authors have pointed out, decision-making by committees also implies 
that statements by individual committee members is increasingly relevant (see Amato et al., 2002, 
Blinder 2004 and Chappel et al., 2004).  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) analyse the communication strategies of the Fed and the 
 Concerning 
dispersion in what they say than the members of the ECB’s Governing Council, which suggests that 
making process of the FOMC is collegial in that most decisions are unanimous. Hence, the ECB is 
                                                           
 In fact, the analysis of communication by individual committee members – and the weighing of their clout -- has become 
an important branch of central banking watching (for a review, see Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005). 
 Unfortunately, no comparable analysis has yet been carried out for the BoJ. 
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ECB/Eurosystem along three aspects: the content, timing and consistency of communication 
the Fed follows a more individualistic communication strategy than the ECB. However, the decision-
more collegial in both its approach to decision-making and in its communication strategy. 
the content of communication, they show that individual FOMC members exhibit a higher degree of 
concerning the inclination of monetary policy and the economic outlook (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3   A Comparison of Communication Strategies and Their Effectiveness 
 













Area of most 
effective 
communication: 


















(only to some 
members, e.g. Fed 
Chairman) 
 











(uniform to all 
members) 
Source: Adapted from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005). 
Note: No comparable analysis has yet been carried out for the BoJ. 
 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) further analyse whether these differences in communication 
strategies have an impact upon the effectiveness of communication.  They find that the predictability 
of policy decisions is high for the FOMC and the Governing Council. However, the reaction of US 
markets to the statements by Chairman Greenspan was significantly stronger than to the statements 
made by other FOMC members; this differs from the euro area, where the markets respond similarly 
to communication by the ECB President and other Governing Council members. The two authors 
conclude that the policies of both the ECB and the Fed are equally effective, despite the fact that they 
pursue different communication strategies. 
 
2.5   Monetary policy strategies 
The main elements of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy are a quantitative definition of price 
stability and a comprehensive analysis of the risks to price stability (Issing et al., 2003 and ECB, 
2003a). In the pursuit of price stability, the ECB aims to maintain year-on-year increases in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium 
term. This clarification can be seen as an attempt by the ECB to reduce disinflationary effects to a 
strict minimum and to keep inflation expectations within a rather narrow margin. As Issing stated in 
2003, “this ‘close to 2%’ is not a change, it is a clarification of what we have done so far, what we 
have achieved – namely inflation expectations remaining in a narrow range of between roughly 1.7% 
                                                           
decisions, and the ability of policymakers to influence financial markets by moving asset prices. 
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21 Such effectiveness contains two interlinked elements: the ability of financial markets to predict future monetary policy  
and 1.9% – and what we intend do do in our forward–looking monetary policy” (Issing, 2003). The 
different risks to price stability are assessed by integrating monetary analysis with economic analysis 
into a unified framework. The economic analysis  ─ focusing on the most immediate causes of 
inflation, such as cost developments and demand-supply imbalances ─ primarily helps to assess short 
to medium-term economic developments and consequently risks to price stability over that horizon. 
The  monetary analysis  ─ focusing on the ultimate monetary determinants of inflation ─ mainly 
contains information for assessing price trends at medium to long-term horizons. In this context, the 
monetary analysis predominantly serves as a means of cross-checking, from a medium to a long-term 
perspective, the short to medium-term indications stemming from the economic analysis. 
ECB officials have on various occasions explicitly referred to the advantages of the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy. For instance, it was stated that “the combination of commitment and 
flexibility that characterises the ECB’s strategy allows for some ‘constrained discretion’ on dealing 
with cyclical output fluctuations in a way consistent with the preservation of price stability” 
(Papademos, 2003). Similar statements have also been expressed by Fed officials: “The approach to 
monetary policy that I call ‘constrained discretion’ can be defined by two simple and parsimonious 
principles. First, through its words and (especially) its actions, the central bank must establish a strong 
commitment to keeping inflation low and stable. Second, subject to the condition that inflation is to be 
kept low and stable, and to the extent possible given our uncertainties about the structure of the 
economy and the effects of monetary policy, monetary policy should strive to limit cyclical swings in 
resource utilization” (Bernanke, 2003b). These quotes seem to show some similarities in the 
interpretation of the respective monetary policy strategies. 
After the stability of money demand broke down in the early 1990s, the Fed started to pursue a 
multi-indicator approach (Ruckriegel and Seitz, 2002), attaching less importance to monetary 
aggregates, but utilising a broad range of financial and economic indicators in assessing its policy 
stance (Greenspan, 1993). While some commentators have labelled this approach a “just-do-it 
strategy” (Mishkin, 2003), Fed officials prefer to term it a “stitch-in-time strategy” (Blinder, 1995). In 
the second half of the 1990s, the Fed was confronted with an increasing number of studies which 
claimed that relatively simple monetary policy rules (linking interest rates to inflation and the output 
gap) can reasonably well describe the way monetary policy was actually carried out over the last 
decade (Taylor, 1993a). Such rules also seemed to coincide with the special emphasis that some Fed 
officials put on the real equilibrium interest rate (Meyer, 1998) – and indeed, Fed officials had 
discussed inflation targeting as a strategy option on various occasions (Bernanke, 2003a). 
More recently, however, representatives of the Fed stressed again that the Fed should not be 
understood as an inflation-targeting central bank, and nor does the Fed regard simple rules as 
adequate (Greenspan, 2004). Instead, a risk management paradigm was introduced into the monetary 
22
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 742 
March 2007 
policy-making, i.e. a strategy directed at “maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our 
goals of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it”. It 
was also emphasised that such a cost-benefit analysis was seen as an ongoing part of the monetary 
policy decision-making process. This approach actually coincides with the fact that the Fed − like the 
ECB − has repeatedly stressed the importance of uncertainty for monetary policy decision-making 
(Issing, 2002 and Greenspan, 2004). 
Like the ECB and the Fed, the BoJ has also refused to adopt an inflation-targeting strategy. This 
does not denote a rejection of such a framework per se, but rather reflects doubts about the 
appropriateness of such a strategy in the current extraordinary state of the Japanese economy (Okina, 
1999). Indeed, in recent years, the BoJ has certainly faced a series of historically unprecedented 
economic challenges. Since the second half of the 1980s, the Japanese economy has experienced an 
extremely large swing following the emergence, expansion and finally the bursting of the asset price 
bubble. This led to instability in money demand in the mid-1990s, a fact which is generally attributed 
to dramatic changes in firms’ borrowing and financial institutions’ lending behaviour. Following the 
BoJ’s application of an increasingly aggressive monetary easing policy and the related extremely low 
short-term interest rates, fund shifts between various financial assets occurred, thus catalysing further 
instability in the relationship between the money stock and economic activity, and consequently 
causing the importance attached to monetary aggregates to decline. This so-called “zero-interest rate 
policy” was adopted with a view to avoiding further recession, putting a stop to deflation and 
preventing the spread of anxiety throughout the financial system.  Given these distortions, the BoJ 
deemed it appropriate to look rather closely at the prices of various financial assets, real economic 
variables, price developments and also at the fund-raising behaviour of firms and households (BoJ, 
2003a). Nevertheless, against the background of the relative “uniqueness” of money as an indicator 
variable, the money stock is still regarded as an important and useful information variable and 
continues to be monitored carefully by the BoJ (BoJ, 2003a).  At present, one issue for discussion is 
how to deal with asset price movements in an appropriate way (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2001). Various 
studies have investigated this question, sometimes against the background of a Taylor-rule 
framework.  Starting in March 2006, the BoJ will also review on an annual basis the underlying 
changes. The level of inflation that the Policy Board members currently understand as denoting price 
                                                           
 Some observers have termed this situation a “liquidity trap”; it remains unclear whether the BoJ itself would concur with 
this description. 
 More specifically, the term “money” refers to the aggregate comprising M2+CDs. 
 It remains uncertain, however, whether a more appropriate policy judgment would have been possible had the BoJ also 
explicitly taken asset price developments into account. A variety of analyses have been produced on the situation in Japan in 
the literature (see Bernanke, 2003c for a recent assessment of this issue). 
23
ECB 









stability from a medium to long-term viewpoint is a year-on-year change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) between zero and 2 percent. Furthermore, from now on, economic activity and prices are to be 
analysed based on two assessments of the risks to price stability: first at a shorter horizon of up to two 
years, and second for a longer horizon. 
 
3.   Some stylised facts of the economic and financial environment 
This section compares some features of the economic and financial environment in which the three 
central banks have been operating over a period starting in the 1980s and ending in 2004. This sample 
allows us to capture some important developments, although the comparison only has an illustrative 
purpose, given that the euro area did not start operating until 1999. This entails two important limitations. 
The first is that, in order to carry out a meaningful analysis, we are forced to use synthetic euro area data 
for a large part of the sample period, which obviously restricts our ability to interpret the results.  
The second limitation stems from the fact that the euro area is indeed a new monetary area, even 
though the process of European integration started as far back as the 1950s for a smaller subset of 
European countries.  The sharing of a new single currency among a group of countries is deemed to 
engender “endogenous effects”, i.e. it may contribute to a further deepening of economic and financial 
integration. This builds on the seminal contributions of Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose (2004), 
who discuss how the euro area could indeed turn into a so-called optimum currency area (OCA), even 
if this was not the case before.  Therefore, the euro area may be witnessing some rapid 
transformation that the other two areas have already experienced. 
Looking at developments in the main macroeconomic variables, it is notable that all the three 
areas have exhibited declining inflation and falling short-term and long-term interest rates (see Figure 
5) since the early 1980s, a process that only temporarily reversed between 1987 and the early 1990s 
(for more details on the worldwide shift in the inflation process towards a low inflation environment, 
see Cecchetti and Debelle, 2006). The Japanese economy then fell into a deflationary regime from 
                                                           
 The euro area data are compiled using national data (see also Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2003). 
 See De Grauwe (2005) and Dorrucci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli (2004). 
 See also De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) for a survey of the drivers of endogeneity and ECB Working Papers Nos from 
594 to 599 for a review of the effects of the euro so far. 
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changes in industrial production.  
 




























































Japan US Euro area
 
                                                           
 Since the early 1990s, the process of disinflation has been accompanied by significant fiscal consolidation in the euro area 
(not shown). Furthermore, when considering the euro area, the most recent period is also characterised by the disappearance 
of the nominal exchange rate and, to a large extent, of inflation risk premia; a slowdown in productivity and population 
growth; and increasing credibility of the convergence process (although at different speeds across national economies). 
 All data used are on a monthly frequency; therefore, the changes inevitably exhibit some volatility. 
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Japan US Euro area
 
Sources: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Eurostat, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Note: Short-term and long-term interest rates are in percentages per annum; real 
growth and inflation rates are calculated as annual percentage changes; the output 
gap is in percent. 
 
We now focus on illustrating some differentials within the three geographical areas. For the US 
we use data regarding the US census regions; for Japan we use data for the 10 Japanese districts; and 
for the euro area, we consider the data for the 12 euro area countries. The data refer to the main 
macroeconomic variables which are readily available for all three geographical areas. However, just 
looking at inflation and growth differentials within the three areas (as measured by the standard 
deviation, see Figure 6), an important phenomenon is worth noting with regard to the inflation 
dispersion: with the exception of the early 1980s, inflation dispersion in the US has remained within a 
considerably narrow range, whereas in the euro area it has been on a downward path (like the 
developments in the euro area inflation rate), and has reached levels comparable to those for the US 
just prior to the launch of the euro. Inflation differentials in Japan have remained at a very low level 
since the 1980s. The second chart in Figure 6 also illustrates a decline, albeit uneven over the sample 
period, in real growth differentials among euro area countries. Data for the US census regions are only 
available starting in 1991. 
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Japan US Euro Are a
Sources: BIS, Eurostat, US Bureau of economic analysis. 
Note: Unweighted standard deviation, annual data for the US census regions, 
the 12 euro area countries, and the 10 Japanese districts. 
 
In summary, these few stylised facts seem to suggest that, during the 1980s and the 1990s, the 
future euro area exhibited more significant, albeit declining, internal differentials across its future 
Member States than was the case with the US census regions and the ten Japanese districts. However, 
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these differentials in inflation and growth have all sharply declined over the last 10-15 years. To some 
extent, the Fed and the BoJ still operate in a more harmonious economic and financial environment 
which is also characterised by a high degree of central policymaking (federal versus state fiscal 
policies). 
Some further differences are worth noting regarding the policy environment in which the ECB 
conducts monetary policy vis-à-vis the Fed and the BoJ. In the euro area, monetary policy is delegated 
to a new supranational European institution, the Eurosystem. However, while the so-called “transfer 
of sovereignty” in the monetary field has been completed successfully, other areas of economic 
policy, such as fiscal and structural policies, still remain decentralised.  This puts the Eurosystem in a 
unique position compared to the other actors in the euro area as well as the EU and its various 
institutions. In particular, a single European monetary policy is compatible with responsibilities for 
many other policy areas, remaining firmly rooted at the national level, as long as the minimum set of 
common objectives, principles and rules established in the Treaty are followed in letter as well as in 
spirit. The Fed and the BoJ, by contrast, do not face such challenges. 
 
4.  Estimation of simple monetary policy reaction functions 
We now turn to the similarities and differences in the actual implementation of the monetary 
policies of the three central banks. While the previous sections have largely focused on a descriptive 
methodology, we now have to examine some more objective elements in order to corroborate our 
previous findings in order to gain a deeper understanding of the similarities and differences between 
the central banks. 
This section analyses the differences with respect to actual monetary policy in practice, using 
information derived from Taylor rules. Sub-section 4.1 contains a general discussion of the use of 
Taylor rules, while sub-section 4.2 estimates the monetary policy reaction functions within this 
framework for each of the three central banks. 
 
4.1   A brief presentation of the Taylor rule 
The use of this monetary policy reaction function is quite well established in the literature in 
order to describe how a central bank sets its policy instruments in response to economic 
circumstances. The Taylor rule is a simple rule which has become rather popular both in the academic 
literature and among professional central bank watchers in recent years, ever since Taylor (1993a) 
showed that the policy actions of the US monetary authorities could be closely replicated using a 
                                                           
 Although fiscal policies are subject to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
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simple reaction function based on a small number of variables. This rule specifies that the central 
bank sets its instrument ─ the interest rate ─ in order to react to two key goal variables: the deviations 
of contemporaneous (forecast) inflation from an inflation target, and the deviations of real output from 
its long-run potential level.  
Therefore, by focusing on policy responses to these key variables, the Taylor rule implicitly 
captures policy responses to economic factors that affect the evolution of these key variables. This 
rule is simultaneously very simple and capable of capturing the essential elements of regimes in which 
the central bank looks at a wider range of variables and relates the policy instrument to current 
economic conditions.  
Notwithstanding the simplicity and elegance of the Taylor rule and its popularity in the literature, 
three general criticisms have to be kept in mind when using Taylor rules to assess monetary policy. 
First, it cannot be assumed that all relevant information needed to conduct monetary policy is 
encapsulated in the current inflation rate and the output gap. Other variables may indeed be highly 
indicative of macroeconomic developments and could help interpret the current economic situation, 
such as monetary and credit aggregates, private sector expectations, fluctuations in exchange rates, 
stock valuations, fiscal indicators, variations in international commodity prices, and wage agreements. 
Second, different sources of shocks call for very different policy responses. The need for 
monetary policy to react to incoming new evidence may depend on whether shocks arise from the 
supply or the demand side of the economy, and whether they represent temporary disturbances to an 
unchanged underlying structure or a lasting alteration in the economic parameters. From this 
perspective, Taylor rules, in restricting the information which triggers policy decisions, are not a 
reliable guide for policy-making. Therefore, the assumption that the decision-making body of any 
central bank could base its decisions exclusively on the information content of inflation and the output 
gap is a gross simplification.  
Third, it is well-documented in the recent literature that Taylor rules can themselves be a source 
of genuine economic instability, by leaving the real economy without an anchor (this issue is, 
however, not dealt with in this paper).  To sum up, quoting Orphanides, “[the] historical analysis 
                                                           
preferences and those describing the structure of the economy (see Favero, 2001). 
 According to Taylor (1993a), the success of such rules in replicating past behaviour would make it possible to define 
reaction functions that the authorities could follow in order to achieve their targets. 
 As Orphanides (2001, p. 965) points out, “…retrospectively, the ‘appropriate’ policy setting for a particular quarter may 
appear different with subsequent renditions of the data necessary to evaluate the rule for that quarter”. 
 These pathologies can even occur when a stabilising Taylor rule (i.e. a rule characterised by an inflation response higher 
than unity) is followed. Christiano and Rostagno (2001) have shown that monetary monitoring (i.e. a policy that includes a 
commitment to switch to a monetary growth target in the event that the economy slips into deflation) might be helpful in 
such a case. 
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 Despite its simplicity, the academic literature has shown that Taylor rules have to be interpreted with a grain of salt. It is 
31 
suggests that the Taylor rule appears to serve as a useful organising device for interpreting past policy 
decisions and mistakes, but adoption of the Taylor-rule framework for policy analysis is not insurance 
that past policy mistakes would not have occurred.”  Notwithstanding these caveats, a comparison of 
Taylor rules across the ECB, the Fed and the BoJ might, to some extent, help in understanding 
whether the responses of these central banks to their contingent economic factors differ and, if so, by 
how much. 
Following a specification widely used in the literature, central bank behaviour can be described 
by a version of the Taylor rule, with an interest rate smoothing specification as follows: 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) tt t t t iy y i ρ α ρβ π ργ ρ ε − =− +− +− − + +                                                                 (1) 
where i is the measure of the interest rate,  t π  is the annual inflation rate at time t and  t yy −  is the 
output gap at time t. This specification of the Taylor rule contains the interest rate smoothing 
term, 1 t i − , on the basis that central banks appear to adjust interest rates in a gradual fashion, slowly 
bringing the rate towards its desired setting or “target” level.  With an inflation parameter larger than 
unity, the rule indicates that the short-term real interest rate should be increased whenever inflation 
rises, thus exerting a stabilising effect on inflation (this is usually denoted as “Taylor principle”). In 
addition to the standard Taylor rule (with and without interest rate smoothing), we also investigate an 
extended version of the Taylor rule, which includes in the feedback list of the baseline Taylor rule 
(which is typically very restricted in terms of variables) other potential additional explanatory 
variables for the interest rate path. Among these variables, we consider the importance of monetary 
aggregates (especially in the euro area) as well as the cross-influence of the monetary policy in each 
country. In this case, using  t x  to denote the additional explanatory variables, equation (1) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) tt n t t t t iy y x i ρ α ρβ π ργ ρδ ρ ε +− =− +− +− − +− + +.                                            (2) 
 
4.2   Some Taylor rule estimations for the three central banks 
We can now estimate monetary policy reaction functions for the three central banks, starting with 
the baseline specification. The sample (based on monthly observations) over which the estimates are 
made is initially for the period from January 1993 to December 2004. This allows us to take into 
                                                           
 Orphanides (2003), p. 984. 
 Of course, the dynamics of adjustment of the interest rate with respect to its recommended level can assume different 
forms (see, for instance, Judd and Rudebush, 1998). 
31
ECB 






account for the euro area the period after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force and the convergence 
period among the euro area countries started. The following variables are used: the interest rate is the 
three-month interest rate , while inflation is calculated as the (annual) change in CPIs. In addition, we 
model the output gap as the difference between real GDP (converted from quarterly into monthly data 
using cubic interpolation) and the corresponding equilibrium measure.  
To take potential simultaneities into account, we estimate the equations using the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM). Table 4 contains the results of the estimations of equation (1). 
 
Table 4   Standard Taylor Rules with Interest Rate Smoothing for the Euro Area, 
the US and Japan 
 
Country  α   β   γ   ρ   2 R   J-Stat. 



























Note: Standard errors in brackets. Sample period: January 1993-December 2004. In the case of Japan, a   
dummy variable has been introduced to take into account the effects of the increase of the consumption tax in 
April 1997, which is assumed to last one year. 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the table. In all cases, the coefficient of 
determination is around 0.99, while the J-statistics indicate the validity of the instruments. As has 
been widely documented in the literature, all three central banks show a high degree of interest rate 
smoothing. The only central bank that shows a significant response to real growth seems to be the 
Fed, which includes potential output growth in its objectives. As indicated by the high and above-
unity coefficient, the ECB places special emphasis on inflation, and is thus the only case where the so-
called ‘Taylor principle” has been fulfilled since 1993. In the case of Japan, the insignificance of all 
coefficients with the exception of the lagged interest rate shows that our simple framework does not 
seem to capture very accurately the special challenges faced by the BoJ. The high degree of inertia 
                                                           
 However, it should be noted that the three-month interest rate also embodies market expectations. Nevertheless, this 
choice is made for reasons of comparability (the EONIA only exists since 1999). 
 The output gap has been modelled as the difference between the (log of) real GDP and the value derived by applying a 
Christiano-Fitzgerald band pass filter. The latter was chosen in the light of the widely documented deficiencies of the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter at the end of the sample. 
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confronting Japan is, however, in line with the zero-interest rate policy followed by the BoJ for a 
considerable time period. 
The latter finding is also confirmed by a closer inspection of three-month interest rates for the 
respective areas and the rate implied by the Taylor rule, which may also help to explain the behaviour 
of the three central banks. Figures 7a, 7b and 7c seem to show that, with the exception of some 
marked, and sometimes even protracted, periods of notable temporary deviations, the short-term 
interest rates and rates implied by the Taylor rule seem to have followed a broadly similar pattern, 
especially for the euro area and the US. Substantial deviations are, however, notable since mid-2003 
in the euro area, which marked the beginning of the constant low interest rate period, while for the 
US, deviations are more widespread throughout the sample. For Japan, the figures show that in 1995 
the country basically entered a different regime, a fact that is again clearly reflected by the 
introduction of a zero-interest rate policy. 
 
Figure 7   The Taylor Rule and Actual Interest Rates 
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This notwithstanding, some considerations should be taken into account. First, for some countries 
such as the US, a longer sample might be more of interest, as the US’s commitment to fight inflation 
dates back to the late 1970s. At the same time, given the zero-interest rate policy followed since 1995 
in Japan, it would be interesting to exclude the following years when Japan embarked on a different 
monetary policy regime. Finally, it would be interesting for the euro area, on the basis of the two-
pillar strategy, to add an additional variable (namely the stock of M3, under the form of the deviation 
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of the annual M3 growth rate from its reference value)  to the reaction function. We also test the 
possible influence of US monetary policy on the euro area. Table 5 contains the results of these 
estimations. 
 
Table 5   Variants of Taylor Rule Estimations for the Euro Area, the US and Japan 
 
Country  α   β   γ   δ   ρ   2 R   J-Stat. 













Euro area  




































Note: Standard errors in brackets. In the case of Japan, a dummy variable has been introduced to take into 
account the effects of the introduction of the consumption tax in April 1989, which is assumed to last one year. 
 
It is striking that, in the case of the euro area, while the Taylor principle continues to be satisfied, 
the change in money exhibits the opposite sign that one would expect. However, this might be 
attributable to the fact that, prior to 1999, the ECB did not exist, and that the countries that now 
comprise the euro area had different policies with regard to money. Conversely, the US federal rate 
turns out to be positively significant, while the inflation coefficient decreases below one. 
Moreover, the results for the US now more closely resemble those for the euro area over the 
shorter sample. This confirms the early findings of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), according to 
which the Fed had maintained its reputation of aggressively combating inflation. With regard to 
Japan, all the variables enter now with the right sign, although the response of inflation is relatively 
small and not statistically significant. However, when using industrial production along the lines of 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler, the Taylor principle is satisfied. 
In the remainder of this section, the Taylor rule analysis is extended to allow for the time-varying 
nature of the implicit equilibrium real interest rate, instead of assuming a constant term in the 
                                                           








equation.  More precisely, the equilibrium real interest rate is derived within a Kalman filter 
framework. In this context, it is assumed that, in the baseline specification of the Taylor rule (see 
equation (1)), the constant (from which the equilibrium real interest rate is derived) follows a random 
walk, whereas the other coefficients are assumed to be constant across the sample period. In order to 
derive the equilibrium real interest rate, the following procedure is adopted. We first estimate 
equation (1) by means of GMM, and afterwards re-estimate it using a Kalman filter approach, where – 
in order to avoid potential simultaneity biases – we restrict the equation coefficients apart from the 
constant to their GMM parameter values. The Kalman filter algorithm provides a posteriori estimates 
of the coefficient vector by means of expression for the expectation of this vector constrained by the 
information set up to the period t and the hyperparameter vector.  This conditional mean provides an 
estimator for the coefficient vector in that it minimises the mean square error.  This yields:  
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) tt n t t t iy y i ρ α ρβ π ργ ρ ε +− =− +− +− − + +,     (3) 
where  1 tt t αα η − =+  and 
2 ~N(0, ) t εσ ,  Q) N(0, ~ t η  and  00 , 0 ~N(a Σ ) ϑ .  
We then calculate the equilibrium real interest rates using the following formula:  
[ ] (1 ) tt r β πα =− ⋅ +   (4) 
where π  denotes the time-varying inflation objective.  Figure 8 shows the respective estimates for 
the equilibrium real interest rates in the euro area (from 1993 to 2004), the US (from 1980 to 2004) 
and Japan (from 1983 to 1994).  While all three measures seem to show plausible magnitudes, there 
seems to be more volatility for the US and Japan than for the euro area.  Moreover, it is interesting 
                                                           
 See also Okina and Shiratsuka (2002) for a similar attempt. Modelling the original constant term (α) as time-varying is 
equivalent to assuming a time-varying equilibrium real interest rate and a time-varying inflation objective. Such a procedure 
prevents changes in the equilibrium real interest rates from being offset by changes in the inflation objective of the same 
size; the latter fact clearly cannot be assumed for Japan in the 1990s. Besides, assuming a time-varying α is consistent with 
our definition of the output gap, i.e. the deviation of output from the Christiano-Fitzgerald band pass filtering trend. 
 For a more detailed discussion of the state-space modelling framework in econometrics, see Hamilton (1994). 
 See Harvey (1990) for a more technical description of the properties of the Kalman filter. 
 We further assume the errors of measurement and transition equations to be mutually and serially uncorrelated. 
average value obtained with the Kalman filter framework, it turns out that for the euro area and Japan the difference is 
negligible, whereas for the United States the average Kalman filtered value lies above the respective GMM value, possibly 
due to its downward trend (which is more pronounced than in the case of the other two areas) over the last two decades. 
 For the euro area, we use the measure derived in Gerlach and Svensson (2003). For the US, we assume an inflation 
objective of 2 percent, as advocated by Taylor (1993a, 1993b). For Japan, we assume 1 percent as an inflation objective, as 
this was conveyed as being in line with most board members’ views of stable prices (see BoJ, 2006). 
 The series derived for the equilibrium real interest rate are shown starting a few months after the beginning of the sample. 
 It should be noted, however, that the results do not – in qualitative terms – greatly differ from some of those obtained by 
Clark and Kozicki (2005, p. 402), for instance. 
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how close the neutral rates for the US and the euro area are at the end of the sample period. Overall, 
the results seem to warrant further exploration, especially with respect to alternative frameworks and 
tools which could be adopted in this type of analysis.  
 







































United States Japan Euro area
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the similarities and the differences among the Eurosystem, the Fed and 
the BoJ. It finds that, while several of their tasks and their respective legal statuses differ somewhat, 
there are fewer differences in their institutional structures and monetary frameworks, as well as the 
use of instruments. Central banking practices around the world have also evolved in the direction of 
greater independence, transparency and the adoption of monetary policy committees, among other 
developments. This has contributed to reducing the differences among the three institutions, a trend 
that can also be observed among other central banks. 
There are, however, some de facto differences in the way monetary policy committees operate. 
For example, when taking monetary policy decisions, both the Governing Council of the ECB and the 
Board of Governors of the Fed officially act by simple majority voting. In practice, both the 
Governing Council and the FOMC operate as collegial committees. Yet, while the former functions as 
                                                           
 See, for example, Laubach and Williams (2003). 
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a genuinely collegial committee practising consensus voting, in the latter the chairman has scope to 
steer the agenda very tightly. The Policy Board of the BoJ, by contrast, operates in a much more 
individualistic manner than the other two. In early 2006 the BoJ revised its framework by quantifying 
its price stability objective in the medium and long term, and by setting a yearly revision of a more 
precise target by the Policy Board members. 
There are also some differences in terms of communication strategies, although, overall, the 
responsiveness of the financial market seems high for both the Eurosystem (concerning monetary 
policy inclinations) and the Fed (regarding monetary policy inclinations and views on the economic 
outlook). However, the Fed does not quantify its definition of price stability, whereas the ECB and the 
BoJ do. Nor does it spell out a fully fledged monetary policy (again in contrast to the ECB and the 
BoJ). The ECB does not publish the minutes of its Governing Council meetings, unlike the Fed and 
the BoJ, although it should be noted that the ECB does provide extensive real-time information after 
interest rate decisions have been taken, and that the decision not to publish voting records has to be 
seen against the background of potential public pressures that the members of the Governing Council 
might face from their respective home countries. All these elements, however, seem to have little 
impact on the actual conduct of monetary policy, and might mainly be explained by institutional 
factors. 
As for the economic and financial environment, over the past two decades all three central banks 
have faced a series of diverse challenges, some of them country-specific (as in the case of Japan), and 
others more global in nature. Early in the sample period, conditions differed considerably in the three 
currency areas, with a much higher dispersion among euro area Member States than within the US 
and Japan.  However, these differences have abated in recent years. 
A comparison based on a very simplistic policy reaction function framework à-la-Taylor shows 
no striking differences in the implementation of monetary policy. It can, therefore, be concluded that, 
in practice, the monetary policies of the Eurosystem, the Fed and the BoJ (if we exclude the more 
recent challenging period) fundamentally do not differ that much. 
 
                                                           
 The economic and financial environment is likely to continue to change for the euro area due to the effects of the euro, 
which should foster further economic and financial integration among euro area Member States. 
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